Question of Case 3000
Will result in indictments
it's interesting, but that's not the most important thing about the relationship. When it comes to doubt of all kinds of evil, this matter rightly thinks that it has crossed the line and is considered a crime. This is naturally police inspectors and prosecution of bread and butter. The issues raised by the submarine issue, however, are just as important, as they are concerned with a completely different matter: the method in which a wide range of security results were taken.
There are at least six issues. First, the sum of the questions asked about whether the Germans were aware that Israel was interested in receiving an additional three submarines was nine, but the decision was only related to the change by the opposition minister Moshe Ya & alon at that time. submarine will replace.
Nine submarines are far beyond our need and sustainability. But how did such an intention come about?
The second issue is, why should such a decision be made so early? The Cabinet approves the Army's multi-year plan, the Gideon program, and shortly after that, this decision arises, and beyond, such a decision.
The third issue is about the defense minister's claim that the prime minister, without his knowledge, wants him to buy two ships capable of detecting submarines from Germany. This is similar to the prime minister's request to buy another F-15 fleet without the knowledge of the US Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the Air Force Commander.
As regards all three of these issues, it should be emphasized that the aim of a multi-annual plan for the defense agency is to achieve maximum security from a certain budget. It is possible and necessary to discuss the optimal equilibrium, but it is unreasonable to make unstable decisions without understanding the full alternative price, and it is impossible not to pass it on to another country before it is thoroughly explored. Internal discussion among Israeli decision makers.
The fourth issue is more troubling: the cancellation of the tender for the purchase of ships by the sea economic zone of Israel and the unilateral decision on the purchase of these ships, unlike the submarines, Thyssenkrup, which has no obvious advantage in this area.
As a result, it appears that large (and more expensive) ships have been purchased more than originally required. There are cases where it is better not to make a bidding and to carry out a transaction between the two states (eg GTG operation), but in such cases the other state is committed to purchasing equipment of similar value from Israel. This is not what is happening here, and the extraordinary pressure is applied, which leads to surprising decisions.
The fifth issue is the unusual request of the German company Histadrut Labor Union to privatize overseas shipyards. Considering that the shipyard is the property of the IDF, it is extremely unusual to say the least of the property purchase negotiations. The place behind the host. Who was aware, and who did he cooperate with?
The sixth issue, and the most disturbing one, is the allegation that an Israeli official has no objection to selling to Germany's German Chancellor Angela Merkel without the knowledge of the defense minister of Israel to develop advanced submarines.
In fact, it may not be a crime in any of these matters, but should these matters be examined only through the criminal prism? Does the police have the necessary data, experience and motivation to study it?
These are two completely different issues: foreign policy and security, and the way the Israeli government operates, including the boundaries of responsibility between various parties.
Even though the severity of suspicions of crime is not ignored, and more importantly, the issues reviewed in Situation 3000 – military-strategic procurement processes and how decisions are made – are of less interest.